GJMM supporters courted arrest in Kalimpong

GJM leaders and supporters courted arrest  in Kalimpong (Above Pix) and other parts of Darjeeling Hills
Pix: Samiran Paul

Two eyes for an eye, the jaw for a tooth

Kanchan Gupta

Even before the CPI(M) could stabilise and get its act together after it was formed in 1964 following the historic split in the CPI over what the Marxists call “revisionism and sectarianism in the Communist 

movement at the international and national level”, it was convulsed by a revolt within. Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal, veteran Communists of north Bengal, insisted that pursuing the path of parliamentary democracy was futile; that conditions were ripe for a rural insurrection to seize state power; and, that till this goal was achieved, the party should play the role of “revolutionary opposition” instead of becoming a part of the bourgeois system. 

By early-1967 Charu Mazumdar had all but declared his split with the CPI(M). The insurrection, when it came, was more of a monsoon uprising than a spring thunder. On May 25 the police fired at protesting landless peasants in a remote hamlet called Naxalbari in north Bengal. That incident triggered what came to be known as the ‘Naxalite movement’, based on Mao’s dictum that “power flows from the barrel of the gun”. It spread like a wild fire from West Bengal to Bihar to Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere. 

The late-1960s and early-1970s were tumultuous years in West Bengal. The United Front experiment had proved to be catastrophic, resulting in political chaos and social upheaval. The Naxalites made the best use of the situation. In 1972 the Congress won the Assembly election and Mr Siddhartha Shankar Ray took charge as Chief Minister on March 19. He immediately set himself to the task of tackling the Naxalite menace. Charu Mazumdar was picked up from his hideout (some of his trusted comrades are believed to have squealed on him after a dose of what used to be known as ‘third degree treatment’ in the pre-jholawallah era) on July 16, 1972, and died 12 days later on July 28 at Alipore Central Jail. Minor distractions like custodial deaths did not bother Mr Ray. He gave the police a free hand and demanded results. He got them. By 1977, the ‘prairie fire’ in West Bengal had been stamped out; nobody was under any illusion that Mr Ray and his police had played by the rule book but everybody heaved a huge sigh of relief. 

Over the following decades the Naxalite movement waxed and waned and waxed yet again. But what began as the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) splintered into innumerable groups, each proclaiming its own ideological line and claiming it to be more correct than that of the others. The cadre, however, continued to be referred to as ‘Naxalites’. In September 2004, three dominant factions — the People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh, the Maoist Communist Centre in Bihar and the CPI (ML-Party Unity) in West Bengal — came together to join forces and launch the CPI (Maoist). They also declared that the movement was no longer to be associated with the peasant uprising in Naxalbari but the larger goal of Maoism (overthrowing the state with the use of force) and the cadre would henceforth be called Maoists, not Naxalites.

Since then, there has been a spectacular rise in Maoist violence. Security experts say up to 180 districts have sizeable presence of well-armed, highly motivated and ideologically committed Maoist cadre. The Government concedes nearly 25 per cent of India’s districts are Maoist-infested. The worst affected States are Chhattisgarh, Odisha, West Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar. What has greatly hampered efforts to quell Maoist violence is the pernicious campaign by the Left-liberal intelligentsia that the state, and not the Maoists, are to blame. The CPI (Maoist) is a banned organisation. Yet it continues to enjoy the support of civil liberties and human rights activists who crowd television studios.

This has only served to embolden the Maoists. A marauding horde descended on Phulwaria Karasi village in Bihar’s Jamui district last Wednesday night and slaughtered 12 tribals. Last Monday, Maoists killed 24 jawans of Eastern Frontier Rifles at Shildah in West Bengal’s West Midnapore district. Many of them were charred alive. The attack was led by a woman, Jagari Baskey, who is said to have the “eyes of a cobra”. Maoist leader Koteswara Rao, also known as ‘Kishenji’, who is in regular contact with mediapersons, issued a statement after the massacre: “We have attacked the camp and this is our answer to P Chidambaram’s Operation Green Hunt… unless the Centre stops this inhuman military operation we are going to answer this way only.”

Maoists, coyly described as ‘Left-wing extremists’ by the Government, are in reality thugs and criminals masquerading as champions of tribals whom they terrorise with guns, loot, rape and murder at will. The much-touted and talked about ‘Operation Green Hunt’ is yet to be launched. The Government’s hand, it would seem, is being held back by intellectuals who have no qualms about justifying murder in the name of Mao. If the Union Government is hesitant to act against what the Prime Minister has repeatedly described as the “gravest internal security threat” which India faces today, then State Governments, barring the Government of Chhattisgarh, have proved to be equally pusillanimous in their approach. Strangely, a Cabinet Minister, Ms Mamata Banerjee, claims that “there are no Maoists” and hence there is “no need for police action”. A Trinamool Congress MP, Mr Kabir Suman, a guitar-swinging wannabe Bob Dylan who has sworn to uphold the Constitution of India, has recently released a music album extolling Chhatradhar Mahato, a Maoist now in police custody.

The time to discuss and strategise the state’s response to Maoist terror is long past. The Government cannot be seen to be abdicating its primary responsibility of protecting citizens from criminal excesses. It must act with the fully fury of the state, and act now. Let there be no mistake: Maoists are thugs and criminals who deserve no mercy; Maoists are dedicated to the goal of overthrowing the state and will never give up their violent ways; Maoists do not respect human rights and hence there is no reason why the state should care a toss about their human rights. The argument about fighting Red terror with development is fallacious. Maoists are the biggest impediment to development projects. They have been blowing up schools, health care centres, panchayat buildings and roads, thus destroying infrastructure needed for taking development to the rural hinterland inhabited by tribals. They are anti-development, yet they claim they are fighting for the welfare of tribals.

The Government’s response must be harsh, relentless and unforgiving: Two eyes for an eye; the entire jaw for a tooth. Maoist terror must be met with overwhelming force. The jholawallahs should be told to go take a walk, or join Kobad Gandhi in his prison cell. Nothing less will suffice.

-- Follow the writer on: http://twitter.com/KanchanGupta. Blog on this and other issues at http://kanchangupta.blogspot.com. Write to him at kanchangupta @rocketmail.com

FOLK CULTURAL FESTIVAL ORGANISED BY HILL STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION OF North Bengal University

Prof. M.P.Dahal  addressing the students (Above) and Renowned Folk singer Hira Devi Waiba Chief Guest  (below) presenting a folk number in the programme          Pix:D.K.Waiba

Shilda’s lesson for govt: Make up your mind on strategic and tactical objectives K.P.S. Gill, the “Supercop” credited with crushing the militancy in Punjab, analyses for The Telegraph the Maoist attack on the Shilda camp as a field officer and notes down the lessons the Bengal government should learn to avoid a repeat of such strikes. On the invitation of The Telegraph during the Lalgarh operations by central forces last year, Gill had visited the region and written a four-part series in the paper titled ‘Truth about Lalgarh’ The trajectory of the Maoist challenge in West Bengal is a stark demonstration of both the Maoist strategy of expansion and the inability of the state and its agencies, despite long histories of experience and voluminous materials easily available on the subject, to comprehend this strategy. Thus, while continuous and systematic Maoist consolidation was being noticed by independent analysts, including those at the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), the leadership at Kolkata had its head buried firmly in the sand, insisting that the Maoists would fail to take root in the state because of the brilliance of the ruling CPM’s land reforms and policies of social uplift.

In the meantime, the Maoists consolidated significant capacities across wide areas of the state, and these became abruptly visible at the time of their choice, when they escalated their movement to a more violent plane. Consequently, though just seven persons were killed in Maoist-related violence in West Bengal in 2007 and 24 in 2008, these numbers suddenly soared to 159 in 2009, and at least 60 persons had already been killed in 2010 by February 24 (ICM data). Crucially, the trajectory and break-up of the violence demonstrate clearly that the initiative remains firmly in the hands of the Maoists. The state’s neglect and the Maoist ascendancy were laid brutally bare in the incident at Shilda in the troubled West Midnapore district, when 24 personnel of the state’s paramilitary Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) were killed (along with one civilian) as their camp was overrun by raiding Maoists. At least 279 persons have been killed in Maoist-related violence in this district alone since 2002 (till February 24, 2010), and yet a unit located in close proximity to the locus of a preponderance of the recent violence, Lalgarh, was utterly unprepared in terms of training, camp location and, crucially, orientation, morale and leadership. Published excerpts from the diary of one of the EFR jawans killed in the Shilda raid are poignant testimony to the abject collapse of morale in the state’s agencies in Maoist-afflicted areas in West Bengal. Suraj Bhan Thapa’s diary recorded: “There is a threat to our lives at all times here. Anything can happen at any time”; and further, “The party politics of a few people has endangered the existence of the country. We are also suffering….” These are the realities that make all the posturing on “co-ordinated strategies” and “clear, hold and develop” approaches so much nonsense. The most rudimentary components of a counter-insurgency (CI) response to the Maoist challenge are yet to be put in place. In truth, state police forces will have to be enormously expanded, prepared, trained, equipped, revitalised and, crucially, led and mandated, before any coherent CI strategy can be effectively implemented in West Bengal. This reality will not be altered by any injection of the much-vaunted “massive deployment” of central paramilitary forces in the afflicted areas. The number of such personnel available (and projected) can have no significant impact on the trajectory of the Maoist insurgency; central forces are, in any event, not the appropriate instrument for an effective CI response. The crisis of capacities in the West Bengal security establishment is something that I have already dealt with in the past, and it is sufficient to reiterate here that, unless the quantum, profile and thrust of police and CI forces in the state are reconciled with the extraordinary conditions in which they are required to fight, no enduring gains can be secured. In the interim, it is imperative that immediate steps be taken to ensure that we don’t have more Shildas in the future — something that is nigh-inevitable in the circumstances currently prevailing. Broadly, the most significant dimensions of the security and effectiveness of CI deployments must include, first, complete operational clarity for each post, camp or station. Past patterns of deployment of various forces have tended to be purely reactive, with little consideration for the strategic and tactical objectives a particular deployment is intended to serve. This was certainly the case at Shilda, where the camp was apparently set up to provide security to the local CPM party office, and little review of its role, capacities and vulnerabilities had subsequently been attempted. The tactical siting of posts and their fortification are further imperatives that were visibly ignored at Shilda — and, indeed, in an overwhelming proportion of existing posts, camps and police stations. High levels of training, and the periodic retraining of all personnel, are also necessary, not only to keep the ranks and field commanders in fighting condition, but also to maintain the very high levels of discipline that are necessary in a CI Force. Senior officials have condemned the ill-fated EFR personnel at Shilda as being “on a picnic”. Such a collapse of discipline, however, is not the consequence of irresponsibility on the part of the camp personnel alone, but of the enveloping conditions of neglect and carelessness created by the police and political leaderships in the state. The necessary regimes to maintain a disciplined, alert and highly motivated force are the responsibility of the higher command structures and the policy establishment – not of the hapless jawans who are being thrown into these crises with little understanding of the purpose or objectives of their deployment. A continuous assessment of threats and capabilities is necessary. The capacities of each post must be calculated and established to ensure complete autonomy of defences for the time that may be required to get assured reinforcements. Deployments must be structured within a mutually reinforcing grid, so that no post is entirely abandoned to its own devices for any significant length of time. All special forces available to the state must, moreover, be integrated with its security plans. It is not clear if the NSG hubs established at Kolkata have been meaningfully integrated with the emergency response and relief capabilities across the state’s CI apparatus. Having such highly trained forces in the state sitting idle, while a major attack is being executed at distances that could quickly be covered by helicopter, makes no sense whatsoever. Under existing arrangements – which were actually in practice earlier – the district magistrate and sub-divisional magistrate have the powers to call on all available forces in the vicinity in the event of an emergency. These powers have now become increasingly centralised. There is urgent need to decentralise these powers once again. The importance of trained field commanders and of high standards of leadership cannot be sufficiently emphasised. Such commanders must undergo battle inoculation before deployment. Each post must be provided an appropriate mix of weapons, including whatever may be needed to confront the military-style assaults of large groups of Maoist attackers. Each camp and post must, moreover, have sufficient capacities for counter-attack, and for offensive strike operations – the initiative cannot be left to the Maoists at all times. Every camp must be self-sufficient for water, electricity, toilets, rations and firewood (firewood, rather than cooking gas, should be the principal fuel at camps). Internal communications within each camp must be absolutely secure and planned to cover every sentry post and the camp’s command centre. Combat personnel must be trained not to mix with local populations –- such fraternisation should be permitted only for separate intelligence cadres. Crucially, the state’s top security leadership must constantly and intensively tour the worst-affected areas to ensure that assessments of threat and capabilities remain current, and that standards, discipline, morale and motivation are maintained at high levels. Eventually, the state must develop its own emergency response mechanism and special forces to tackle such situations. There is constant handwringing about the costs of such forces, but such costs are far exceeded by the cost of the trained personnel lost to the Maoists each year, the compensation and maintenance that falls due to the families of the personnel killed, and the incalculable damage done to the morale of both the forces and the general public by each successful Maoist attack. These are not the ideals that we are to aspire to; they are the minimal conditions necessary to ensure that fighting forces are capable of protecting themselves, and of acting effectively against the rising Maoist offensive in West Bengal.

Bengal assures Sikkim of smooth traffic - Flout groups to face action for blockades

TT, Gangtok, Feb. 26: Bengal chief secretary Asok Mohan Chakrabarti today assured the Sikkim government that no stones would be left unturned to keep NH31A open at all times under instruction from the Supreme Court.

The national highway is the only arterial route linking the Himalayan state to the rest of the country.

“We assure you that we will try our level best so that the directive issued by the Supreme Court to keep NH31A open is followed. Any group that flouts the order will face legal action and everybody has to cooperate with the order of the apex court,” Chakrabarti told The Telegraph during the tea break in the three-hour session with Sikkim chief secretary T.T. Dorji and senior officials at Chintan Bhavan today. 

In recent times, frequent bandhs and agitation by the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha in Darjeeling district have hit traffic on NH31A. For that matter, any agitation in the Bengal district adjoining Sikkim, affects traffic on the national highway.Replying to queries on security on NH31A to ensure smooth connectivity, Chakrabarti iterated that the directives of the apex court not to allow disruption on the highway had to be followed in principle. “If anybody violates the Supreme Court order, they will have to go to jail,” said Chakrabarti.

“The Union and the Bengal governments are rather disturbed over the fact that in the last five to six months there have been incidents of traffic disruptions on NH31A which is the lifeline of Sikkim,” Chakrabarti said.“Sikkim gets its essential commodities by road and people travel to Siliguri to catch flights and trains. Disruptions along the highway cause immense problems for the Sikkimese,” he said. He added that all security arrangements were in place to ensure that there were no traffic disruptions. Three companies of the CPRF have been deployed from Tuesday at various points along NH31A passing through Bengal to Sikkim.The Bengal chief secretary said a decision had been taken on February 3 in New Delhi to hold a meeting in Gangtok to discuss NH31A and three projects related to the highway. The projects include the widening of the national highway and construction of an alternative road from Rhenock in East Sikkim to Chalsa in Bengal.

“These road projects were delayed in certain areas and a lot of time was taken for forest clearances. We have discussed them and some decisions have been taken to expedite the projects,” Chakrabarti said.Every Tuesday, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) and the forest and the land acquisition officials will meet in Siliguri to resolve the bottlenecks of the projects. The BRO would send its representatives to Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri district magistrates regularly to pursue the formalities for forest clearance.“The meeting was to expedite the process by achieving proper co-ordination at all levels,” Chakrabarti’s counterpart Dorji said. He said the BRO’s top priority was to tackle the troublesome spots hit by constant rock falls and sinking zones on NH31A. Once these spots were attended to, the remaining areas would be taken care of, he added.

The Bengal delegation also comprised the inspector-general of police, north Bengal, K.L. Tamta, the Darjeeling superintendent of police, D.P. Singh, and the district magistrates of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, Surendra Gupta and Vandana Yadav.Representatives from the Union ministry of surface transport and forests also attended the meeting. The Sikkim side included the director-general of police, C.M. Ravindran, the inspector-general of police (law and order), S.D. Negi, principal secretary (home) Jasbir Singh and BRO Project Swastik’s chief engineer Brigadier R.K. Patyal and representatives of the army.

‘Ban’ on vehicles off

The Gorkha Janmukti Vidyarthi Morcha has decided to lift its “ban” on movement of police and government vehicles from tomorrow, reports our Darjeeling correspondent. “We have decided to lift the ban taking into account the Sukna episode. The police and administration have to move around. Moreover, the parent party (Gorkha Janmukti Morcha) has already called for a jail bharo agitation,” said Amrit Yonzone, the vice-president of the Vidyarthi Morcha.The students had imposed the “ban” on February 5 after a gathering of Youth Morcha supporters was lathicharged. The Morcha members were demanding permission to hold a public meeting in Siliguri. On February 21, a mob demanding the immediate arrest of an alleged murderer, had set on fire the Sukna police outpost.

Poster game after death in MLA family 

TT, Darjeeling, Feb. 26: A poster signed by “Gorkhaland loving people” appeared in town this morning, announcing that loyalists of the separate state movement would not attend the funeral of the Kurseong MLA’s husband who died last night.Deo Chandra Karki, 53, had been ailing for sometime and breathed his last at the Kurseong subdivisional hospital.The poster that appears to have been put up at 6am reads: “Yesterday, Deo Chandra Karki, husband of anti-Gorkhaland MLA from Kurseong, Shanta Chhetri, died. We, the Gorkhaland loving people, will not attend the funeral.” It was signed by “Gorkhaland loving people”.

After fingers were pointed at the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha which had chased away most of the GNLF leaders from the hills, including Chhetri, Gurung’s party put up a counter-poster at 9am, “protesting” the one plastered by people “trying to derail our Gandhian movement”.“We protest the poster plastered by Gorkhaland loving people. These are people who are merely trying to derail the Gandhian movement,” the poster put up by the Morcha’s Kurseong sub-divisional committee read.Chhetri’s house had been torched and the Kurseong police station attacked on February 18. Chhetri had blamed the Morcha without naming Bimal Gurung’s party. 

The Morcha had denied the allegations.After the arson, Chhetri had spent the night at the hospital along with her son and daughter-in-law, before moving in to a relative’s house. “The last rites could not even take place at my house. They torched my house. I have lost everything now,” a sobbing Chhetri said over the phone. The body was taken to Gauri Shankar tea garden below Giddepahar, about 8km from Kurseong, which is Karki's native place. By 2pm, when the funeral took place, about a thousand people had visited Chhetri family to express their condolence.Karki, an employee with the Public Health Engineering department, was also an All India Radio-approved singer and a tabla player.On August 18, 2008, GNLF chief Subash Ghisingh could not bring his wife’s body to the hills for cremation after she died at a private nursing home in Siliguri. Even then fingers had been pointed at the Morcha. The party had denied the allegations and had said it was the “public” who did not allow Ghisingh to come to the hills.

Charge of cop excess & demand for freedom

TT, Siliguri, Feb. 26: The Association for Protection of Democratic Rights (APDR) and the Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh today alleged that police had rampaged through Sukna after a police outpost there had been torched on February 21 and demanded action against the law enforcers responsible for the excesses.A team comprising members of the APDR and the Parisangh — an apolitical body of Gorkhas — today visited Sukna, 10km from here, and demanded the release of all those who had been arrested in connection with the arson.Eighteen people were arrested from Sukna after a mob demanding the arrest of a murder accused had set the outpost on fire.

“We went there today to verify the allegations levelled by several residents that police had resorted to indiscriminate arrests and ransacked houses and shops on Sunday night,” said Abhiranjan Bhaduri, the Darjeeling district secretary of the APDR. “The team spoke to the family members of the arrested people and found that after the arson, the police had picked up men and women indiscriminately.”He alleged that innocent women had been dragged out of their homes and thrown into police vans. “They were beaten up when they tried to protest. This is blatant violation of law. 

We demand that the arrested people be released immediately and action be taken against policemen responsible for the incident.”Bhaduri also alleged that the police had smashed windowpanes of the houses, ransacked shops and damaged vehicles. “An 80-year-old woman named Chandrakumari Rai told us that her daughter, son, daughter-in-law and employees serving at an eatery run by the family had all been picked up by the police.”Bhaduri also said even patients had not been spared. “Damayanti Thapa, who had been operated on 10 days back and was recuperating, was also arrested.”He said the office-bearers of both the organisations, armed with photographs and other evidence of police excesses, would meet senior district officials and demand the release of the arrested people.Sukhman Moktan, the secretary-general of the Parisangh, echoed Bhaduri. “After the raids and random arrests by the police, Sukna has been shut down with life being far from normal. The men have left their homes to evade arrests, while the women are too fearful to open shops.”The police, he said, should free all the arrested and refrain from targeting others at Sukna.

Hill tea touches nadir in decades - Low yield for Less rain & slump 

TT, Darjeeling, Feb. 26: Production of Darjeeling Tea has hit an all-time low largely because of the vagaries of nature and the global meltdown.From a record high of 14 million kg of tea annually in the early 1980s, the production has come down to 7.8 million kg in 2009. In 2008, the figure was 8.2 million kg.Ramesh Kumar Boruah, the advisory officer of the Tea Research Association (Darjeeling), said: 

“Over the past decade, we find that the hills have been receiving almost 18 to 20 per cent less rain which is unevenly spread.”Citing the example of Sonada valley, which has around six gardens, Boruah said: “In 1990-91, the valley had received 3,579mm of rain. In 2008-09, the rainfall was 2,529mm.”Tea bushes require sustained and uniform water for better yield. “We have noticed that wind velocity has increased and the humidity level has gone down. 

The disparity in rainfall is such that its difference can be around two inches in adjoining areas,” Boruah added.Despite less rainfall in the hills, the region had experienced up to 20 inches of rain in a single day in 2009 during Cyclone Aila. Such torrential rain is of no good to the bushes, industry officials said. “The water cannot be retained but the top soil with all its nutrients gets washed off. Chances of landslide also increase,” said Sandeep Mukherjee, secretary, Darjeeling Tea Association.Darjeeling Tea is also reeling from poor prices following the global meltdown. “Darjeeling exports around 60 per cent of its produce. 

However, we are not getting the desired prices,” said Mukherjee.The cost of producing a kilogram of tea is estimated to be between Rs 240 and Rs 310 for organic gardens and Rs 170-180 for non-organic estates. Of the 87 registered gardens in the hills which can sell their produce as Darjeeling Tea, almost 60 per cent are already organic or are on the verge of conversion.Experts also cite the failure to replant tea bushes as a reason for production fall. “Many of the gardens have bushes which are 100 to 140 years old. Old bushes do not yield as much as young ones,” Boruah said. The Tea Board of India and the TRA have recommended that at least 2.5 per cent of the plantation area should be replanted every year. Last year the industry could undertake this task only in 0.67 per cent of the plantation area. The total plantation area of Darjeeling Tea is 17,500 hectares.

Mild tremor

TT, Siliguri: A mild tremor was felt in parts of north Bengal at 10.12am on Friday. The intensity of the quake that originated at Western Xizang in China was 5.4 on the Richter scale, experts said. It lasted for four seconds. The epicentre is located 249km away from here. No major damage has been reported.

Bengal Governor visits EFR  unit at Salua

Former NSA says never advised state govt on anti-Naxal operations

IE, Salua, 27 Feb: Denying he ever advised Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee on anti-Naxal operations, former National Security Advisor and West Bengal Governor M K Narayanan today met the jawans of Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) personnel and their family members at Salua in Kharagpur and said being a former policeman himself, he had come here in a “spirit of atonement”.

The state paramilitary force lost 24 of its jawans on February 15 when heavily armed Maoists swooped on its Silda camp to launch a deadly attack.

In a brief interaction with the media after meeting the bereaved family members of the slain EFR personnel, the Governor said: “I am here not to do an assessment of the situation. There is no effort on our part to do an assessment. But whatever I have seen and understood, I will pass it on to the chief minister and other ministers. Our main aim is to avoid similar tragedy.”

Narayanan dismissed reports he was advising the government on anti-Maoist operations in the state. “I have not given any advice to the government on the anti-Maoist operation. But I had discussion with the chief minister on the issue,” he said.

“I have come here to meet the families of the slain jawans. This is a heart-wrenching moment. It is a matter of poignancy and it has to be addressed with a spirit of atonement,” said Narayanan, adding the

family members of the deceased jawans have reasonable demands.

Sona Subba, wife of Madhukar Subba, one of the slain jawans, said, “Governor gave us a patient hearing. He assured us all our demands would be fulfilled. Four of the primary schools will be converted to higher secondary schools. The hospital will have permanent doctors and our residential complex will soon get a boundary wall.”

Petrol, diesel prices hiked

Sujay Mehdudia, TH,

NEW DELHI: The oil marketing companies have announced a hike in petrol price by Rs. 2.71 a litre and diesel price by Rs. 2.55 with effect from midnight on Friday night, after Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee juggled customs and excise duties in the Union budget. He also imposed a 5 per cent customs duty on crude import.

Now, petrol price in Delhi will go up from Rs. 44.72 to Rs. 47.43 a litre and diesel price to Rs. 5.47, as indirect tax proposals come into effect immediately.

This follows the hike in customs duty on petrol and diesel from 2.5 to 7.5 per cent, and in excise duty by Re. 1 a litre to Rs. 14.35 and by Rs. 4.60 a litre on non-branded (normal) petrol and diesel respectively.